Access-certificate CA: certificate policy and practice statement

Version 1.0 · 19 October 2026 · applies to the access-certificate CA published by this site at /wrpac-ca.ashx?ca.

Status: test and private use. The CA key is a software key on the server, encrypted with the operating system’s machine-level data protection and with file access limited to the site; administrators of the server could still reach it. It is not held in a hardware security module (HSM) yet. The register of relying parties is this site’s own register, not a Member State’s national register. The CA has not been audited. Certificates therefore carry this CA’s own policy identifier and not the ETSI policy identifiers for wallet-relying party access certificates. Do not rely on these certificates beyond test and private arrangements.

1. Introduction

The CA issues wallet-relying party access certificates: certificates with which a relying party (a website or app that requests data from EU Digital Identity Wallets) identifies itself to wallets. Certificate content and processes are modelled on ETSI TS 119 411-8 V1.1.1 (clause 6) and the requirements of Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/848, Annex IV, as far as stated below; they have not been assessed for conformity.

Policy identifier2.25.195586870214937213748673734628273007303 (this CA’s own policy)
ETSI policy identifierNCP-l-eudiwrp 0.4.0.194118.1.2 is not asserted while the CA key is in software and the CA is not audited
Subscriberslegal persons registered in this site’s relying-party register with a valid status
Certificate useauthentication of the relying party towards wallets (signing of presentation requests); no other use

2. Publication

CA certificate/wrpac-ca.ashx?ca (DER), ?ca&format=pem
Revocation list (CRL)/wrpac-ca.ashx?crl, free of charge, at any time
CA facts/wrpac-ca.ashx?info
This document/wrpac-cps.html (the CPS URI in every certificate)

3. Identification and registration

4. Certificate lifecycle

5. Facility, management and operational controls

6. Technical security controls

CA keyECDSA P-256, generated on the server, stored encrypted with the operating system’s machine-level data protection, file access limited to the site; used only through the CA key store interface
Planned changethe CA key moves to an HSM; the CA software already separates the key store so that this is a change of the store, not of the CA
Signature algorithmecdsa-with-SHA256, deterministic signatures (RFC 6979)

7. Certificate and CRL profiles

CA certificateself-signed; basic constraints CA, path length 0; key usage keyCertSign, cRLSign; 10 years
Subject (relying party)countryName, organizationName (official name), organizationIdentifier (ETSI EN 319 412-1 form, e.g. VATMT-12345678), organizationalUnitName (instance, optional), commonName (user-friendly name)
Subject alternative namesupport website (URI), e-mail (rfc822Name), phone (otherName id-at-telephoneNumber) – as registered; optional dNSName entries for x509_san_dns client identifiers
Key usagedigitalSignature (critical); no CA
Other extensionscertificate policies with CPS URI; authority information access (CA certificate); CRL distribution point; authority and subject key identifiers
CRLX.509 v2, CRL number, authority key identifier, reason codes

8. Audit

None yet. The ETSI policy identifier will only be asserted after the CA key is in an HSM and a conformity assessment against ETSI EN 319 411-1 and ETSI TS 119 411-8 has been passed.

9. Other matters

Test and private use: no warranty and no liability beyond what the operator of this site agrees in writing with a relying party. Questions and revocation requests: through the contact details of this site.